Technology strategy and innovation: the use of derivative strategies in the aerospace industry by Smith, DJ & Rogers, MF
Technology Strategy and Innovation: The Use of Derivative Strategies in the 
Aerospace Industry 
 
D.J.Smith and M.F. Rogers* 
Nottingham Trent University, *Civil Aviation University of China 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Strategy has become an increasingly important theme within the management of 
innovation. This is reflected in the increasing amount of attention given to topics such 
as technology strategy within the innovation literature. However research into 
technology strategy has tended to focus on technology acquisition rather than 
technology exploitation.  
 
This paper focuses on one often neglected way in which companies can exploit the 
technological resources at their disposal, namely through the use of a derivative 
strategy where new technology is combined with old products or parts of old products 
in order to develop new products. The paper explores this type of strategy by means 
of a case study from the commercial jet engine sector of the aerospace industry. The 
case study provides an opportunity not only to explore the nature of derivative 
strategies in detail it also highlights the benefits, both direct and indirect, to be gained 
from this type of strategy as a means of exploiting an organisation’s technological 
resources. 
 
The paper shows how a derivative strategy can contribute to the broader strategic 
goals of companies in technology based industries through strategies designed to 
ensure the most effective utilization of the technology base. 
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Technology Strategy and Innovation: The Use of Derivative Strategies in the 
Aerospace Industry 
 
 
Introduction 
The rise, within the field of strategic management, of interest in the resource-based 
approach to strategy1, has led to renewed interest in technology as one of the key 
resources of the firm. This in turn has produced a growing literature on technology 
strategy2,3 as firms consider the most appropriate way to utilize their technological 
resources in the longer term. 
 
The concept of technology strategy is defined by Clarke et al.4 as, 
 
 ‘a strategic approach to the development of a firm’s technology.’ 
 
By this they mean that issues to do with a firm’s technology should not be left to ad 
hoc short term decisions, but instead should be a central concern of senior 
management planning on a long term basis.   
 
According to Clarke et al.5 the central issue in technology strategy is the acquisition, 
development and exploitation of technology. Acquisition concerns decisions 
surrounding both the technologies to invest in and how to invest. Clarke et al.6 note 
that where the latter aspect is concerned, firms can vary the degree to which 
technology acquisition is integrated into the organisation’s activities. The degree of 
integration ranging from developing technology in-house to collaboration, licensing 
and the acquisition of assets. The need to span an ever-greater range of technologies 
has made technology acquisition a strategic issue in many technology-based 
companies according to a study by Granstrand et al.7. In their study of technology 
strategy in UK firms Clarke et al.8 found evidence of increasing use of external 
methods of technology acquisition, especially among larger firms. This is true of the 
pharmaceutical industry where firms are increasingly turning to external sources as 
conduit for acquiring appropriate technologies, and doing so via a variety of 
collaborative arrangements9. 
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Just as the acquisition of technology is one of the central concerns of technology 
strategy, so too is the exploitation of technology, but it appears to have received less 
attention from researchers. Having acquired and developed technological resources,  
technology strategy recognises that firms face a variety of options when it comes to 
the most appropriate exploitation of them. 
 
Among the strategic issues surrounding the exploitation of technological resources are 
the means to be employed and the question of timing. This latter aspect has spawned a 
modest but influential literature. When it comes to timing, Christensen10 has 
highlighted the dilemma faced by innovators. There are those, such as Foster11 who 
advocate the benefits of early moves to secure a ‘first mover’ advantage, while others, 
such as Teece12 have noted that in some circumstances a ‘follower/imitator’ strategy 
may be more appropriate. 
 
When it comes to the means for exploiting technologies a variety of degrees of 
integration are available. Much attention in recent years has focussed on external 
arrangements for exploiting technology. This is especially true of the aerospace 
industry. External methods such as licencing have long been popular in aerospace, 
reflecting the huge sunk costs of aerospace programmes and the often complex 
political issues surrounding market access. More recently the aerospace industry has 
attracted a variety of collaborative arrangements13. Generically termed strategic 
alliances, they include various forms of joint venture and risk sharing partnership.  
 
While the external means for exploiting technological resources have attracted 
considerable attention, the internal means have remained somewhat neglected by 
researchers reflecting the relative lack of developments in this field. The means for 
exploiting technological resources through internal means is normally confined to 
innovation in the form of new product development. However  as Keeble14 has 
pointed out, innovation is not confined to new product development, it can also 
involve continuing product innovations. Rothwell and Gardiner15 have explored the 
latter under the umbrella term of  ‘re-innovation’. Significantly one of the industries 
they focus on is aerospace. 
 
Having observed16 that, 
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 ‘most studies of technological innovation have concentrated  upon the 
commercial introduction of a new product,’ 
 
they note that in many industry sectors there are relatively few completely ‘new’ 
products reaching the market. This causes them to highlight the importance of ‘post 
launch improvements’ which they observe can range from, 
 
‘design modifications and minor improvements to a complete re-think or a 
major re-design.’ 
 
Where the latter is concerned Rothwell and Gardiner17 comment that, 
 
‘it is sometimes possible to develop a new product, satisfying a new market, by 
utilizing existing technology or components.’ 
 
They give the example of Black and Decker’s development of a heat gun for paint 
stripping in the retail DIY market. Rothwell and Gardiner’s work in highlighting this 
means of exploiting technological resources is significant. It is interesting that in 
addition to the Black and Decker example, they also cite examples from the aerospace 
industry. However they make little mention of another way in which this strategy can 
work, using new technology instead of existing technology. This is commonly used in 
aerospace where new products, especially aero engines, are developed by replacing 
outdated technology with new technology to create a new product that meets new 
market requirements. The CFM56 engine developed for the commercial market by 
General Electric and SNECMA, which was based on the ’hot core’ of the  F101 
military engine18, is a good example19. In aerospace this is usually termed a derivative 
strategy rather than re-innovation and the aim of this paper is to explore the concept 
of derivative strategy as a means of exploiting the technological resources of the firm 
as part of a technology strategy. Specifically the paper aims to explore the nature of 
derivative strategy, identify the potential benefits from this kind of technology 
strategy and explain why aerospace firms find it an attractive proposition. The paper 
does this by means of a case study of an aero engine programme. The programme in 
question is Rolls-Royce’s Tay engine, which was undertaken in the 1980s with the 
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very specific intention of transferring technology from the company’s large high 
thrust RB211 engine to one of its older medium sized engines.  
 
 
Rolls-Royce: Aero Engine Manufacturer 
 
Rolls-Royce is one of three companies worldwide with the capability to design, 
develop, manufacture and market commercial jet engines. Founded in 1904, as a 
manufacturer of cars the company moved somewhat reluctantly20 into aero engine 
manufacture during World War 1.  However war time priorities meant that aero 
engine production soon exceeded that of cars. During World War 2 Rolls-Royce 
entered the field of turbojet technology when it acquired Frank Whittle’s pioneering 
jet engine from the Rover company21 . Rolls-Royce was able to use the expertise it 
had built up during the 1930s in developing compressor technology for supercharging 
conventional piston engines like the highly successful Merlin22, to produce a viable jet 
engine for military use. By the end of World War 2, the company led the world in jet 
engine technology and the Rolls-Royce Nene engine was the leading turbojet engine 
of the late 1940s23.  In the 1950s Rolls-Royce jet engines powered the world’s first 
commercial jet airliner the De Havilland Comet24. However during the course of the 
first phase of the commercial jet engine industry’s evolution25 between 1958 and 
1967, the civil jet airliner market came to be dominated by US manufacturers26, who 
increased their share of total civil aircraft sales from 40 per cent in 1960 to 85 per cent 
in 196727. These aircraft were powered in the main by engines built by the American 
engine maker Pratt and Whitney28. Furthermore projections made by Rolls-Royce in 
1967 suggested sales of its civil aero engines then in production would decline from 
£69 million to under £4 million in 197529. Hence when the second phase of the 
industry’s evolution began in the late 1960s30 with the development of the first wide-
bodied jets, Rolls-Royce saw this as an opportunity to remedy the situation by making 
a concerted effort to break into the American market. Unfortunately it was the 
development of the high thrust RB211 that led to a financial crisis in 1971, which 
resulted in the company being taken over by the UK government and the car division 
being sold off.  
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Rolls-Royce in the 1970s  
 
Despite early difficulties, the RB211 engine proved to be a technical success 
powering the Lockheed L1011 airliner, one of three first generation wide bodied jets 
that helped transform the economics of air travel in the early 1970s31.  Sales of the 
RB211 were strong during the 1970s helped by two factors. 
 
The first was the switch from single sourcing, where airliners were built using a single 
make of engine, to multiple sourcing where airliners were offered a choice of engines 
built by different manufacturers. This change accompanied the introduction of the 
first generation of wide-bodied  airliners in the early 1970s. Hithertoo nationalism had 
been a feature of most sourcing decisions. Thus airliners built by the American 
manufacturer Boeing during the 1960s32 were fitted with engines produced by the 
American engine manufacturer Pratt and Whitney. However when Britain pulled out 
of the European Airbus consortium in 1969, it opened the way to General Electric of 
the US with its CF6 engine supplanting Britain’s Rolls-Royce33 as engine supplier on 
the Airbus programme. The move away from nationalism to a more commercial 
environment suited the airlines as it gave them more choice and meant that 
competition between engine manufacturers resulted in lower prices. This change of 
policy also helped Rolls-Royce enormously. During the 1970s Rolls-Royce developed 
both up-rated and de-rated versions of its RB211 engine, in order to extend the 
number of airliner applications it could offer beyond the Lockheed L101134. 
 
The second factor was the oil crisis of the late 1970s. A dramatic rise in the cost of 
aviation fuel meant airlines were increasingly interested in installing the most 
efficient engines.  From 1975 until 1981 when Pratt and Whitney introduced a new 
fuel efficient version of its JT9 engine, Rolls-Royce’s 524 version of the RB211 
engine was the most fuel efficient engine available for the Boeing 747 jumbo jet. As a 
result British Airways and several other airlines ordered 747s fitted with Rolls-Royce 
engines. 
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Rolls-Royce in the 1980s 
 
Rolls-Royce’s success in recovering from the financial crisis of the early 1970s, 
masked a number of underlying difficulties that began to surface as the new decade 
opened and the commercial jet engine industry entered what Bonacorssi and Giuri35 
identify as the third phase of the industry’s evolution beginning in the early 1980s. 
 
The first of these difficulties was a deteriorating financial position36.  In 1980 the 
company started to make substantial losses, caused in large part by a decision not to 
hedge the foreign exchange risk associated with its foreign currency transactions37. 
This policy had brought significant profits in the late 1970s, but as Britain became an 
oil exporting nation in the early 1980s, and the in-coming government instituted a 
high interest rate policy, the company was caught out by the rapid appreciation of the 
UK pound.  In 1981 Rolls-Royce made a loss of £93m and this worsened to £115m38 
two years later, almost all attributable to the foreign exchange risk associated with its 
American contracts39. 
 
The second of these difficulties focussed on adverse competitive conditions at the 
beginning of the decade. The combination of de-regulation in the US and a worldwide 
recession40 made life very difficult in the civil aviation business. Orders for new 
airliners fell sharply. From a level of 700 to 800 new jet airliners per year in the late 
1970s, orders fell to 223 in 1982, and in that year Rolls-Royce sold a total of 30 of its 
RB211 engines41. To add to the company’s woes, Lockheed its principal customer for 
the RB211 announced that it was exiting civil aviation work by ceasing production of 
its L1011 wide-bodied jet, with the last L1011 being completed in 198342.  By 1985 
Rolls-Royce had just 11 per cent of the commercial jet aero engine market compared 
to General Electric’s 32 per cent and Pratt and Whitney’s 51 per cent. 
 
The third problem area surrounded the introduction of new Federal Aircraft 
Regulations (FAR): Part 36, Stage 3 noise regulations, designed to curtail aircraft 
noise, and due to come into effect in 198643, which meant that Rolls-Royce’s existing 
medium-sized engines of 10,000 – 20,000lbs thrust, the Spey and the Conway, which 
had been designed at a time when noise issues were not a priority, would be obsolete. 
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This would not only affect sales of airliners fitted with Rolls-Royce engines, but other 
aircraft as well including the highly successful Gulfstream business jet.  
 
*********** 
Insert Table 1 
*********** 
 
Finally Rolls-Royce faced the prospect that since most of the airliners which utilized 
its medium sized  jet engines had, or soon would, cease production.  Table 1 shows 
that by 1980 most of the first generation European airliners introduced in the 1960s, 
had ceased or were about to cease production. Since almost all of these airliners, 
including the French built Caravelle, were Rolls-Royce powered, the company was 
facing a bleak position in terms of sales of all but its large engines.  
 
Just how bleak this picture was is illustrated by figures from Rolls-Royce itself. The 
company estimated that in 1980 it was producing engines for just four types of 
commercial airliner44. This compares with General Electric which offered engines for 
nine types and Pratt and Whitney which offered engines for ten45. With such a narrow 
product range inevitably Rolls-Royce’s long term prospects in the commercial jet 
engine market were poor.  
 
 
New Engines 
 
By the early 1980s Rolls-Royce was not the only company worried about the 
consequences of new noise regulations. The American business jet manufacturer 
Gulfstream, was extremely concerned. The company’s Gulfstream III business jet 
powered by two Rolls-Royce Spey engines was proving very successful46. Table 2 
shows that sales to American customers were building up steadily in the early 1980s 
and these were matched by a similar level of sales to foreign customers. Despite this 
Gulfstream faced problems over noise, not only the prospect of new much tougher 
FAR  Stage 3 noise regulations due to come into force in 198647, but complaints from 
local committees around airfields across the US where Gulfstream III aircraft were 
operating.  Gulfstream also faced the prospect of increasing competition from new 
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competitor aircraft then under development, especially the French built Dassault 
Falcon 900 and the Canadian  Canadair Challenger CL601. These new aircraft were 
direct competitors in the ‘heavy iron’ 48 niche of the business jet market that 
Gulfstream had previously had to itself. Faced with these problems, Gulfstream 
looked initially at using a ‘hushkit’ for its Spey engines. The design favoured was a 
‘translating ejector’ – a retractable form of noise suppressor. Unfortunately the design 
proved expensive to develop, added considerable additional weight that resulted in 
reduced fuel consumption. As a result Gulfstream decided not to proceed with this 
option.  
 
*********** 
Insert Table 2 
*********** 
 
The problems with the Spey had long been recognised. The Spey engine was 
developed in the late 1950s and ran for the first time in December 1960. It had been 
designed and built in a hurry as a ‘crash programme’, following a ‘diktat’49 by 
Britain’s  state-owned airline BEA in 1959, that the planned De Havilland Trident 
airliner, for which BEA was the prime customer, be reduced in range and size (from 
120 seats to 87). This meant that the Rolls-Royce Medway engine of 14,000 lbs 
thrust, that De Havilland planned to use, was too big. As a result Rolls-Royce had to 
very rapidly develop a new smaller engine, the 10,000lbs thrust Spey, at short notice.   
Having pioneered the fanjet or turbofan principle on its larger Conway engine50, 
Rolls-Royce again opted for a similar design for the Spey. The architecture of the 
turbofan creates a flow of air that bypasses the engine core. This flow of air not only 
improves the efficiency of the engine it also reduces engine noise. Unfortunately 
Rolls-Royce at the time failed to appreciate just how effective this could be. The 
bypass ratio, which governs the proportion of air on a turbofan design that bypasses 
the engine core, was set at a lowly 0.64 on the original Spey51 design. This meant that 
the fuel consumption of the Spey was poor, but this was not regarded as critical since 
the Trident was intended for short haul operations where fuel economy is much less 
important. Unfortunately the low bypass ratio also meant that the Spey was a 
notoriously noisey engine. At the time, in 1960, jet airliners were still something of  a 
novelty, with relatively few in operation (jet services only started in 1958). 
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Consequently aircraft noise was not the major environmental issue it had become by 
the end of the decade. 
 
 
The RB401 engine 
 
Rolls-Royce’s Bristol Engine Division had since 1974 been developing a new and 
more efficient small turbofan engine. Developed by what had been Bristol Siddeley 
engines until taken over by Rolls-Royce in 1966, the RB401 was an internally funded 
engine project in the 5,000 lbs thrust class designed for the developing market for 
medium-sized business jets. First run at the end of 1977, the RB401 was an advanced 
design with a high bypass ratio that incorporated a number of features from its much 
larger cousin the RB21152. Designed as a replacement for the Viper engine, the low 
parts count and excellent performance figures meant that the RB401 should have been 
attractive in the business jet sector of the commercial jet engine market. Unfortunately 
this sector is extremely fragmented53 and it is not uncommon for engine companies to 
be unable to find a launch customer who can provide an economically viable launch. 
This proved to be the case with the RB401, and by 1980 no applications had been 
secured. 
 
Hence when the American business jet manufacturer, Gulfstream,  seeking a new 
engine that would meet the new FAR stage 3 noise requirements due to come into 
force in 1986, proposed a revised and up-rated version of their large, long range, 
Spey-powered Gulfstream III business jet, to be called the Gulfsream IV, the Bristol 
team were keen to put forward their engine. Gulfstream had a long association with 
Rolls-Royce. The first executive aircraft built by Grumman, the Gulfstream I, which 
first flew in 1958, was powered by two Rolls-Royce Dart turboprop engines. All the 
later versions of the Gulfstream used Rolls-Royce engines. Although the RB401 was 
significantly less powerful than the Spey, Gulfstream was sufficiently impressed with 
the performance and the noise level to commit to the new engine. To achieve the 
required amount of power the preliminary specification of the new up-rated 
Gulfstream IV, was a 4 engined design using the Rolls-Royce RB40154. The use of 
the RB401 meant that compared to its predecessor, the Gulfstream IV would meet the 
new noise requirements with ease. Gulfstream even began to explore a new smaller 
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capacity 2 engined design , the Gulfstream V using two RB401 engines, and aimed at 
a different sector of the fragmented business jet market.  
 
Seeing the RB401 as the solution to its problems, Gulfstream, which had split off 
from its parent company Grumman and was now led by Allen Paulson, raised the 
necessary finance for development work on the Gulfstream IV from a consortium of 
banks. Design work on the 4-engined, RB401 powered Gulfstream IV began in 1981. 
As well as having new engines the Gulfstream IV design incorporated a number of 
other technological improvements including a super critical wing, extensive use of 
composites and state-of-the art electronic instrumentation. 
 
However when Allen Paulson and his colleagues at Gulfstream learnt in December 
1982, only one week before the official launch of the 4 engined Gulfstream IV, that 
Rolls-Royce were planning another more powerful engine that was also capable of 
meeting their requirements but with two engines rather than four, they cancelled the 
project with immediate effect. The other engine that Rolls-Royce was planning was 
the Hi-flow Spey or as it was eventually known, the Tay engine. 
 
 
The Tay engine 
 
The studies which led to the launch of this other more powerful engine, began with 
the search by the Dutch aircraft manufacturer, Fokker, for a quieter powerplant as a 
way of overcoming the problems it faced with its Spey powered short haul F28 
regional airliner55. Work on the ‘Hi-flow Spey’56 as the engine was initially known, 
began at East Kilbride53, Rolls-Royce’s plant in Scotland in 1981. Opened in the early 
1950s to make engines for the Korean War58, historically the plant dealt only with 
military engines. However internal reorganisation and rationalisation undertaken by 
the company at the start of the 1980s as part of a major cost cutting drive59 had 
resulted in Derby becoming the focus for work on large high thrust engines like the 
RB211, with production of older commercial engines, like the Spey, being transferred 
to East Kilbride. In spite of the rationalisation, East Kilbride at the time retained a 600 
strong design team60. Able to offer an integrated service that included design, 
development and product support as well as production,  the East Kilbride plant had 
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close links with customers such as the Dutch aerospace firm Fokker. Staff were aware 
that the company was looking to upgrade the successful F28 airliner to meet new 
market requirements in terms of fuel economy and noise. 
 
There had been earlier attempts to develop a quieter Spey engine. The Spey like the 
Conway, the world’s first fanjet or turbofan was basically a turbojet which bypassed 
only a small fraction of the inlet flow. According to Gunston61 the Spey was 
developed,  
 
‘just at the time that Rolls-Royce was recognising that its choice of bypass 
ratio was much too timid’. 
 
Consequently earlier work on the Spey had focussed on simply fitting a larger fan to 
the front of the engine in order to raise the bypass ratio and make it quieter. In the 
mid-1970s, work on the Spey 60662, a new version of the Spey with a larger fan to 
give an increased bypass ratio of 1.96, reached the detailed engineering design stage. 
However the airframe application intended for this engine, the BAC One Eleven 700, 
never materialised because of the nationalisation of the British Aircraft Corporation to 
create what became British Aerospace.  
 
When Gulfstream cancelled their proposed 4 engined Gulfstream IV, Rolls-Royce 
was forced to move very quickly. The company’s head of civil engines at the time, 
Ralph Robins, hurriedly negotiated a deal with Gulfstream whereby they would use 
Rolls-Royce’s alternative engine design on a two engined version of the proposed 
Gulfstream IV.  The terms of the deal, covering price, performance and delivery were 
famously sketched on a table napkin and agreed over dinner by Ralph Robins and 
Allen Paulson in December 198263.  The Tay, as the new engine was now known, was 
officially launched in March 1983 with an order from Gulfstream for 200 engines 
together with a cash deposit. Allen Paulson said that he expected Gulfstream to buy 
more than 300 engines over a 10 year period.  Some months later in November 1983 
Fokker ordered 100 engines for its new F100 regional jet and further orders soon 
followed (see table 3). 
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*********** 
Insert Table 3 
*********** 
 
Development of the Tay proved remarkably rapid. The project was helped by the fact 
that Ralph Robins, who had secured the deal with Gulfstream, was appointed Rolls-
Royce’s Managing Director in 1984. Not only was he familiar with the project and 
one of its most enthusiastic supporters, he was now in a position to act as ‘godfather’ 
to the project ensuring that the various hurdles the project faced were successfully 
negotiated. This was important. The Thatcher government had won a second term in 
1983 and indicated that it wanted to see Rolls-Royce privatised in the near future. As 
a result short term financial performance was a high priority for the company.  The 
business case for the Tay showed that although total expenditure on the project was 
comparatively modest at almost £100million, the greatest outlay was likely to occur in 
the run up to privatisation. Cashflow was unlikely to be positive until the end of the 
decade. Under these circumstances the project had some important internal hurdles to 
clear within the company, that could easily have led to cancellation.  
 
As it turned out development of the Tay proved remarkably trouble free. Design 
studies were completed in August 1983. The Tay engine ran for the first time a year 
later in August 1984. By June 1985 Rolls-Royce had six engines on test. In the same 
year the project faced major uncertainty as the American car maker Chrysler bought 
Gulfstream for $637million64. However the uncertainty soon subsided when Allen 
Paulson was retained as president and chief executive. The first Gulfstream IV was 
rolled out in September 1985 and the first flight took place on 19th September 1985.  
The Tay engine was certificated in 1986 and entered service on schedule on the 
Gulfstream IV in spring 1987. By this time Rolls-Royce had a more powerful version 
of the Tay running and it entered service on the Fokker F100 in April 1988. 
 
The Tay proved to be one of Rolls-Royce’s most successful and most profitable 
engines. Sales were better than initially forecast.  As table 4 indicates, the introduction 
of the Tay engine resulted in the company regaining its share of this important market 
segment.  In October 2002, shortly before Ralph Robins, by now nearly 70, retired as 
Chairman of Rolls-Royce, Gulfstream took delivery of its 1000th Tay engine for the 
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Gulfstream IV. Nor was success confined to the ‘heavy iron’ business jet market. 
Table 3 shows that the engine enjoyed  considerable success in the regional airliner 
market, with deliveries of the Fokker F100 and its sister airliner the slightly smaller 
F70, reaching more than 300 by the late 1990s. In addition the Tay successfully 
opened up a market niche that was not part of the original business plan when the 
engine  was first launched, namely the market for re-engining airliners being 
converted to freighters. The company’s biggest success in this market came in 1990 
when Rolls-Royce successfully negotiated the sale of 280 Tay engines as part of a 
$600 million contract to re-engine the entire Boeing 727-100 fleet of United Parcel 
Service (UPS) to enable it to meet new more stringent noise regulations65.   
 
*********** 
Insert Table 4 
*********** 
 
 
Derivative Strategy: the application of advanced technology 
 
Unlike the earlier Hi-flow Spey project that was ultimately stillborn, the Tay engine 
project involved much more than simply fitting a bigger fan. The aim was to take the 
well proved and reliable high pressure ‘hot core’ of the Spey engine and combine it 
with elements of the advanced technology developed as part of the RB211 
programme. In this the Tay differed from other similar derivative engines produced 
by Rolls-Royce at this time such as the 524 and 535 engines. These were derivative 
engines, but they were developed as up-rated and de-rated versions of the RB211. 
That Rolls-Royce was able to develop two new engines in this way was testimony to 
the RB211 concept which proved to be a truly robust design66.  
 
The Tay was different in that the intention was not so much to make it more or less 
powerful (in fact it was considerably more powerful), but to apply the technology of 
another more modern engine programme, in order that it could meet the more 
demanding requirements of the market.  
 
djs/Tay Engine/01 December 2009 14
Post-P
i t
Unfortunately the ‘hot core’ of the original Spey engine as used in the Trident and 
BAC One Eleven airliners did not have a very good record in terms of reliability. 
However a later version of the engine, the Mk 555 developed for the Fokker F28  
airliner, was much more reliable and the ‘hot core’ of this version of the Spey formed 
the basis of the Tay. To this ‘hot core’, or high pressure (HP) section which forms the 
heart of a modern turbofan engine, was added a new fan and associated booster stages 
at the front of the engine, a new low pressure (LP) turbine at the rear of the engine, 
needed to power the new fan, a new combustion system and a new larger bypass duct. 
In each case the opportunity was taken to employ the latest RB211 derived advanced 
technology in each of these modules.  
 
The most obvious case of this was the new fan. Early single stage fans, such as that 
employed on the Spey used high aspect ratio blades made from forged titanium. The 
blades themselves were long and thin. The width of the fan blade was restricted by the 
need for low weight in order to avoid containment problems in the event of damage to 
the fan. While a narrow blade was lighter it was subject to vibration.  To eliminate 
this it was necessary to brace the blades at approximately mid-length by means of a 
‘snubber’, a reinforcing ring designed to support the blades. The snubber contributed 
nothing to the fan’s primary function and had an adverse effect on efficiency because 
it gave rise to pressure losses that reduced the flow capacity of the fan67.  
 
In place of this type of arrangement, the Tay utilized a ‘wide chord’ fan derived from 
the 535E4 version of the RB211. Rolls-Royce’s attachment to the idea of a wide 
chord fan went back to the 1960s when the company developed a wide chord fan 
constructed of carbon fibre composite for the original RB21168. Unfortunately while 
the fan proved more efficient, it presented problems of blade integrity which at the 
time could not be resolved. However, while the company was forced to revert to a 
titanium fan using snubbers for the RB211, it stuck with the idea of a wide chord fan 
and in the early 1980s developed a hollow titanium wide chord fan that was both light 
and strong. The first engine to benefit from this development in fan technology was 
the 535E4  engine which first flew in August 1983 and went into revenue earning 
service on the Boeing 757 in October 198469.  
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A key feature of the wide chord fan was that the wider blades were more rigid. This 
eliminated the need for a snubber, which in turn improved the aerodynamics of the 
fan. A wide blade could use a more efficient airfoil profile70. It also meant that the fan 
needed fewer blades and the 535E4 engine had 22 blades compared to 33 on the 
earlier 535C version. The result was a significant increase in fan efficiency from 88 
per cent to 92 per cent. The end result was less weight, less noise and less fuel 
consumed. The noise and efficiency benefits were particularly important, since the 
introduction of the wide chord fan came in the wake of the second oil crisis and just 
before the introduction of tighter noise regulations. 
 
First fitted to the 535E4 engine, as an innovation the wide chord fan had important 
implications for Rolls-Royce’s product portfolio. The fan is one of the pivotal engine 
sub-systems on a turbofan engine71. On a high bypass ratio engine the fan provides as 
much as 75 per cent of the thrust of the engine. Hence improvements in fan efficiency 
have important implications for engine economics. The wide chord fan represented 
what Henderson and Clark72 term a modular innovation. This type of innovation 
according to Henderson and Clark73 is,  
 
 ‘an innovation that changes a core design concept without changing the 
 product’s  architecture’.  
 
Since it doesn’t change the architecture, the scope for retrospective applications 
should be considerable. This is exactly what Rolls-Royce proceeded to do with the 
innovative wide chord blade design,   
 
 ‘diffused back into the RB211 family to improve further the fuel and thrust 
 ratings.’74 
 
As figure 1 shows the wide chord fan technology was duly applied to the more 
powerful 524 engine that powered the Boeing 747 and the collaborative V2500 engine 
that powered the Airbus A320. However one of the first applications after the 535E4 
was the Tay engine. 
 
*********** 
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Insert Figure 1 
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The fan on the Tay employed a solid titanium fan blade, rather than a hollow one, but 
it was nonetheless a wide chord design and it provided significant improvements in 
thrust, fuel economy and noise reduction. 
 
Nor was the wide chord fan design the only example of RB211 advanced technology 
utilized on the Tay. The opportunity was taken to significantly increase the bypass 
ratio. By the early 1980s Rolls-Royce, along with other engine manufacturers had a 
better grasp of the design features of turbofan engine architecture, helped by their 
experiences in developing the first generation of high bypass engines like the RB211. 
As Gunston75 notes,  
 
‘the advent of the giant wide-bodied airliners made it self-evident that their 
quiet fuel efficient technology would have to percolate down to smaller 
airliners’. 
 
Thus the fan used on the Tay was bigger than that on the Spey, being some 44 inches 
in diameter, and this made it possible to configure the engine with the bypass ratio 
raised from 0.64 on the Spey to 3.076. With a much bigger proportion of the flow of 
air into the engine now bypassing the core, this made the engine both quieter and 
more efficient. 
 
The bypass duct through which the air was fed represented another area where new 
technology was applied. Rolls-Royce was one of the first aerospace companies to see 
the potential of carbon fibre technology. Although its first application of this 
technology, the carbon fibre fan, proved unsuccessful, the company continued to be, 
‘interested in the use of carbon fibre for aero engines’77. The Tay was the first 
commercial aero engine to utilize a carbon fibre bypass duct78. Using this material 
brought benefits in terms of reduced weight and greater strength.  
 
Other major engine sub-systems benefited from the application of advanced 
technology developed for Rolls-Royce’s large high thrust engines. On the Tay a new 
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combustion chamber was developed incorporating porous Transply material  that 
reduced the amount of cooling air required resulting in improved engine efficiency79. 
Similarly a new three stage low pressure (LP) turbine was used with improved 
aerodynamics designed for high efficiency and low noise generation80.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Essentially the development of the Tay engine provides an example of the application 
of advances in technology to an existing well established product, in order to create a 
new product. That the resulting product genuinely was new, and not just a modest 
incremental improvement, can be gauged from the fact that the Tay engine was fitted 
to new aircraft such as the Gulfstream IV business jet and the Fokker 100 airliner. As 
an example of technology strategy the Tay case illustrates one way, amongst many, in 
which an organisation’s technology and technological resources can be exploited.  In 
the process it also shows that derivative strategies, which are commonly used on 
aerospace programmes, are not confined to up-rating or de-rating an aircraft or an 
engine, as in the case of Rolls-Royce’s 524 and 535 engines or for that matter 
producing a commercial version of a military engine as General Electric did with the 
CF34 version of its T34 military jet engine, in order to create a product ‘family’81 by 
virtue of a ‘robust design’. 
 
As a case the Tay engine sheds light on the potential benefits to be derived from 
derivative strategies.  When compared with the alternative technology strategy of 
developing an entirely new engine, the derivative approach, as exemplified by the Tay 
provides a number of benefits. For an engine manufacturer, such as Rolls-Royce,  the 
benefit of utilizing an existing engine ‘hot core’ is that it significantly reduces the cost 
of developing a new engine82 and getting it into production. Since the ‘hot core’ is the 
part of the engine that, in terms of temperature and pressure83, operates under the most 
extreme conditions, it is inevitably the most difficult element in an engine’s design84 
and very expensive to develop, test and certificate. On a new engine developed on a 
‘clean sheet’ basis, development costs typically exceed $1 billion85. The Tay in 
contrast cost only £100 million to develop. Some measure of the impact of this cost 
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saving may be gauged by the fact that by the 1990s the Tay was acknowledged to be 
Rolls-Royce’s most profitable engine programme86. 
 
Secondly the development of a new engine ‘hot core’ is a lengthy process. Again this 
is because this section of the engine operates under such demanding conditions. 
Inevitably it takes a long time to design, develop and certificate. The development of 
a new ‘hot core’ can easily mean that it takes six to ten years to get a new engine into 
production, even longer than for the development of a new airframe87. In contrast the 
development of the Tay, using an existing reliable and well proven ‘hot core’ took 
four years. Given the gap that had appeared in Rolls-Royce’s product portfolio by the 
early 1980s when the company could supply engines for just four civil airframe 
applications88, reducing the lead time taken to get the new engine into service was an 
important consideration. 
 
Finally using an existing core reduces can provide important benefits for an engine 
manufacturers’ customers, especially when the engine is a relatively small one and 
used on aircraft such as regional jets which are used for short routes and therefore 
subject to extensive maintenance. Parts on the ‘hot core’ of the engine, such as high 
pressure (HP) turbine blades, represent one of the major costs to an operator in terms 
of the purchases of spares89. Hence using an existing ‘hot core’ means that airlines 
have much less need to re-train maintenance staff or invest in additional spares 
inventory. 
 
However as well as these direct benefits from a technology strategy based on applying 
new technology to an existing and established product to create a new product, there 
are further indirect benefits that have important  implications in terms of corporate 
strategy and the strategic management of an enterprise. 
 
Firstly, Rolls-Royce’s long term strategy has in recent years been to achieve a 30 per 
cent share of the total commercial jet engine market90. In the 1970s and 1980s the 
company’s market share was at best about 10 per cent. The logic behind the pursuit of 
a substantially bigger market share as a strategic goal is that the commercial jet engine 
market has traditionally been dominated by three firms, the ‘Big Three’ of Pratt and 
Whitney, General Electric and Rolls-Royce, and that to remain competitive it is 
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necessary to maintain a substantial slice of the market. In an oligopoly comprising 
three firms, a market share of less than 30 per cent makes it difficult to remain 
competitive because the market leader will inevitably have a much bigger market 
share. Not only does this mean a gap between the firm in question and the market 
leader, in terms of volume of production, it in the commercial jet engine market it also 
means a gap in terms of the installed engine base. Since sales of commercial jet 
engine spares are a function of the size of a company’s installed engine base, and 
spares are typically the most profitable part of the aero engine business, this puts any 
firm with a small share of the market for new engines at a serious disadvantage. In 
order to maximise market share engine companies need to be represented in as many 
sectors of the commercial jet engine market as possible, because airlines tend to stick 
with existing engine suppliers91. Hence a technology strategy that helps an engine 
manufacturer extend its product portfolio rapidly and economically, as was the case 
with the derivative strategy employed for the Tay engine, has important indirect 
benefits in terms of long term strategy.  
 
The second aspect is to do with technology itself, especially the maintenance of a 
competitive technology base. In the aerospace industry, technology is critical for 
competitive advantage and this means that firms have to spend vast sums on R & D in 
order to maintain a competitive technology base. Given this huge investment which is 
an essential requirement, especially in the aero engine sector, in order for firms to 
keep up and remain competitive, aero engine manufacturers have increasingly to look 
to ways of making the best use of their technology base. This means taking every 
opportunity to put the technology derived from the technology base to work. In Rolls-
Royce’s case this amounts to a deliberate policy. Described at one time as a policy of 
‘economy in technology’92 and more recently as a policy of ‘create once and use 
many times’93, it amounts to applying the technology developed for one engine 
programme to as many other engine programmes as possible in order to gain 
economies of scope.  
 
Both of these strategic considerations meant that Rolls-Royce was anxious to extend 
its product portfolio to the point where it was represented in all the market segments 
that made up the commercial jet engine market. This formed the basis of the 
company’ s  competitive  strategy. Such a strategy is described as a ‘full line 
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strategy’94 95, implying that aero engine manufacturers aim to offer a product portfolio 
that covers all sectors of the commercial jet engine market. Thus the derivative 
strategy employed to develop the Tay engine, as well as providing direct benefits also 
contributed indirect benefits. These were particularly important in terms of the 
company’s competitive strategy, the cornerstone of which was the maintenance of a 
competitive technology base. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The case study of the Tay engine provides valuable insights into the use of derivative 
strategies in the aerospace industry. As far as the nature of derivative strategy is 
concerned, the Tay case shows that such a strategy can involve more than developing 
up-rated or de-rated versions of an existing product. Similarly it shows that it can 
involve more than the use of an existing design or existing components in the 
development of a new product. The case clearly shows that a derivative strategy can 
be a way of exploiting new technology, in this case Rolls-Royce’s wide chord fan 
technology, by applying it to components or modules of an existing product in order 
to develop, a new product. When used in this way, a derivative strategy represents one 
form of technology strategy, in that it is a means of exploiting the technological 
resources of an organisation. 
 
The Tay case, occurring as it did at a crucial point in Rolls-Royce’s recovery and 
return to a position of strength within the Big Three group of aero engine 
manufacturers, brings into sharp relief the benefits of a derivative strategy. However 
one of the advantages of a case study of an engine programme begun 20 years ago is 
that one can set what occurred against the backdrop of developments across the 
engine sector of the aerospace industry. Doing this shows that the direct benefits of 
the use of a derivative strategy, in terms of a shorter lead time and lower development 
costs, were not the only benefits that accrued. In fact the use of a derivative strategy 
contributed significant indirect benefits. In the main these have taken the form of 
economies of scope through spreading the cost of maintaining a competitive 
technology base. Given the importance of competing through technology for aero 
engine manufacturers, especially those who compete in the large engine sector where 
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performance in terms of fuel efficiency is critical to success, this is clearly a valuable 
contribution. 
 
When the direct and indirect benefits are taken together, it becomes perhaps a little 
clearer why derivative strategies are popular and widely used, as a form of technology 
strategy, in all sectors of the aerospace industry.  
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Table 1 
 
World Commercial Jet Transport Deliveries 1958-85 
 
Aircraft Deliveries  Orders  
Boeing 707 957 (last delivery 1979)   
Boeing 727 1831 (last delivery 1984)   
Boeing 737 1139  246  
Boeing 747 617  40  
Boeing 757 49  13  
Boeing 767 121  72  
MDD DC8 556 (last delivery 1972   
MDD DC9 976 (last delivery 1985)   
MDD MD80 237  157  
MDD DC10 369  8  
Lockheed L1011 249 (last delivery 1984)   
Convair 880/990 102 (last delivery 1970)   
US sub-total 7203 83.7% 371 61.9% 
     
DH Comet 112 (last delivery 1967)   
Aerospatiale Caravelle 279 (last delivery 1973)   
HS Trident 117 (last delivery 1978)   
BAC VC10 54 (last delivery 1970)   
BAC 1-11 232 (last delivery 1987)   
BAe 146 30  23  
Fokker F28 222 (last delivery 1987) 15  
Fokker F100 -  38  
Mercure 10 (last delivery 1975)   
VFW 614 10 (last delivery 1980)   
Airbus A300 253  17  
Airbus A310 71  46  
Airbus A320 -  90  
Europe sub-total 1404 16.3% 229 38.1% 
     
Total 8607  600  
     
 
 
Source: Hayward (1986: p23) 
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Table 2 
 
Deliveries of Gulfstream GIII Aircraft to US customers 
 
 
Year  US deliveries 
1980 10 
1981 20 
1982 22 
1983 22 
1984 25 
1985 12 
1986 8 
1987 1 
1988 2 
Total 122 
 
 
Source: Phillips, Phillips and Phillips (1994) 
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Table 3 
 
 
Sales and Deliveries of Fokker Airliners 1984-96 
 
 
 Sales Deliveries 
Year F100 F70 F100 F70 
1984 8
1985 26
1986 36
1987 0
1988 3 8
1989 93 27
1990 33 25
1991 10 53
1992 18 46
1993 30 8 67 1
1994 11 17 33 26
1995 10 16 15 13
1996 0 6 4 6
 278 47 278 40
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (1997) The European Aerospace Industry, Brussels.
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Table 4 
 
Jet Engine Market Share: 10,000lbs – 20,000lbs segment 
(Engine Deliveries) 
 
Year CFM-
International 
Pratt & 
Whitney 
Rolls-Royce Total 
1981 - 611 40 651
1982 - 378 40 418
1983 - 236 60 296
1984 22 229 34 285
1985 160 194 30 384
1986 260 234 38 532
1987 266 248 36 550
1988 324 262 38 624
1989 288 234 50 572
1990 356 284 90 730
1991 448 270 126 844
1992 460 194 124 778
1993 324 70 112 506
1994 252 44 56 352
1995 142 28 78 248
 
 
Source: European Commission (1996) European Aerospace Industry, Brussels. 
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Figure 1  
Applications of Wide Chord Fan Technology 
 
Source: Ruffles (1986) 
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